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Introduction
There is extensive theoretical and empirical literature on the potential gains from trade. Given constant returns to scale, perfect competition and the absence of distortions, traditional trade theory shows that there are considerable welfare gains from market integration through trade.
If anything, the majority of empirical studies confirm that outcome, showing that trade is positively associated with growth rates.
1 However, this linkage is not always robust and may depend on the country sample, period and methodology used. Likewise, some studies have shown that trade may have an uneven impact on growth rates: At given levels of openness, some countries are more likely to benefit from trade than other countries. For example, while a number of Southeast Asian countries have seen spectacular growth rates, partly due to an aggressive export-oriented development strategy, several African or Latin American nations were less able to harness the benefits of trade.
Following this, the question arises as to what the prerequisites for a positive linkage between trade and growth and thus, a successful trade liberalisation, would be. Needless to say, this issue is of enormous importance for policy makers who intend to harness the benefits of the globalisation of their country. Fortunately, some evidence already exists for a number of policy areas. Countries that have better macroeconomic management (stability), wellfunctioning infrastructure, and competitive markets may trade more than countries where these conditions are not met (WTO, 2004) . More importantly, if these prerequisites are ensured, trade may also have a more beneficial impact on growth rates. Though both theoretical reasoning and empirical evidence are persuasive, we do not believe that these prerequisites alone are sufficient, but rather, we believe that there are further determinants of a successful dismantling of trade barriers. In the following, we will point out that having institutions of high quality may directly or indirectly have an impact on the linkage between trade and growth.
Institutions can be defined as humanly devised constraints that structure political, economic and social interactions (North, 1990) . They exist to reduce uncertainties that arise from incomplete information concerning the behaviour of other individuals in the process of interaction. In the field of economic interaction, institutions are to decrease information asymmetries by channelling information about market conditions, goods and participants.
This facilitates comprehensible and mutual co-operation between market actors. Property rights, contracts and the rule of the law are most prominent institutions .
If economic actors can trust property rights or the rule of law, transaction costs are reduced.
This promotes the establishment of new business, facilitates the emergence and the functioning of markets and contributes to higher efficiency. High-quality institutions allow for operating on a larger scale and for using more efficient technologies. This increases productivity, improves competitiveness, facilitates structural change and contributes to a better division of labour in the national and international context. Above all, the quality of institutions results from the efficiency of the rules of economic interaction and the effectiveness of their enforcement. Governance and the rules for governance are of particular importance for the selection and design of efficient rules, for their diffusion and, finally, for their enforcement including surveillance, dispute settlement and sanctioning of violations.
As to the linkages among institutions, trade and growth, our main argument is relatively straight forward: While trade improves welfare increasing specialisation and fosters productivity growth within industries, in turn forcing uncompetitive firms to exit and allowing successful firms to expand, trade cannot induce specialisation or discipline firms if factor movement is restricted. In many economies, low institutional quality in the form of strict regulations prevent, for instance, labour from moving across sectors or across firms. In these countries, trade may be less able to serve as a force of growth. If the structure of economic activity is rigid, trade has only a modest impact on the allocation of resources across and within industries. What is more, to the extent that production structures change, low institutional quality may encourage increased production of the wrong goods -goods the country has no comparative advantage in.
The literature on the importance of institutional quality for the interaction of trade and economic growth is very limited. So far, only Bolaky and Freund (2004) addressed that question directly in a cross-country approach. They compiled an aggregated regulation indicator and then used it to examine the linkages between trade and income levels as well as trade and growth rates. They incorporated a sample of 108 countries and find in their empirical analysis that countries with excessive regulations do not benefit from trade.
The impact of institutional quality on the reallocation of resources within a particular economy, on the other hand, has been analysed to some extent. Most (case) studies offer only modest evidence of significant labour reallocation as openness increases in developing countries (Currie and Harrison, 1997) . It has been stressed that trade reform in Mexico did not affect employment due to excessive labour regulations (Revenga, 1997) . A comparison of the Portuguese and the US labour markets, on the other hand, demonstrates that employment protection has strong negative effects on the reallocation of labour (Blanchard and Portugal, 2001 ). This result would imply that increased openness to trade will have a lower effect on growth in economies with inflexible labour laws.
In countries with excessive regulations, industries respond to shocks, such as a lowering of trade barriers, through the expansion of existing firms, while in countries with low entry barriers, industries respond through the creation of new firms (Fisman and Sarria-Allende, 2004 ). In addition, in countries with high entry barriers, industries characterised by large sales turnover tend to have only a few large firms while countries with low entry barriers have many smaller firms. Thus, regulation distorts the structure of an industry, promotes industry concentration, and affects the number of entrants to an industry in case of external shocks.
Similarly, there is evidence that entry regulations lead to less entry (in Western and Eastern Europe), especially in industries with naturally high entry barriers (Klapper et al., 2004) .
Likewise, there is less entry into labour-intensive industries in countries with excessive labour regulations.
Against this rather limited evidence, this paper will extend the literature by focussing on institutional quality (rather than just regulations) and by adding a highly disaggregated (crosscountry) analysis to identify the most important (sub-)components of institutional quality that matter most for a positive impact of trade on (long-term) growth rates. In this case, institutional quality will be proxied by good governance and government regulations. The paper is structured as follows: The next section introduces the indicators used for measuring institutional quality. Following this, Section 3 embraces the model specifications. Two different estimation techniques, that is, ordinary least squares (OLS) and instrumental variable (IV) regressions, will be used. While the first technique provides a first impression of the order of magnitude of the estimated coefficients and the significance levels, only the IV approach can account for the endogeneity of the variables, since both trade and institutional quality are likely to be endogenous. Section 4 presents the empirical results, with a special focus on the disaggregated indicators for institutional quality that are more important. Finally, Section 5 concludes and provides some policy implications for institutional reform.
Measuring Institutional Quality
Although the overall importance of institutions for economic development has been emphasised in the literature, 2 there is less agreement on how to measure the quality of institutions. For a long time, researchers who undertook empirical research on the effects of institutions had to rely on relatively few sources, such as the International Country Risk Guide (PRS Group, 2005) or the Global Competitiveness Report (World Economic Forum, 2005) .
While both organisations publish a large variety of relevant indicators, they retrieve their information from executive and resident opinion polls and thus measure the perceived level of institutional quality. For the majority of these indicators, they do not use factual information to measure differences in institutional quality across countries.
In a similar approach, Kaufmann et al. (2005) • Starting a Business gives information on the average number of procedures required to start a business, the number of days and the costs required to complete the process and the minimum capital needed to start up a business • Labour Market Regulation combines three different dimensions: flexibility and costs of hiring, flexibility and costs of firing, and conditions of employment To facilitate a quantitative analysis, we first compute standardised figures for each (sub-)component of the ten indicators. However, a higher figure for any component may be associated with either more or less rigid regulations. In order to have a consistent set of indicators and to facilitate the interpretation of the results, we will multiply by (-1) if a higher figure is associated with more rigid regulations. As a consequence, a higher figure will always be associated with less restrictive regulations. Finally, we compute the means of all components and standardise them again to obtain consistent indicators.
While the Doing Business indicators are available for a total of 155 countries, we have to restrict the regressions that include these indicators to a sample of 142 countries, since information for other variables is not available.
5 To obtain an overall index of regulations for each country (the variable is labelled Regulation Index), we compute a weighted average of nine out of ten regulation indicators. We do not include Protecting Investors, as information for a further eight countries for this indicator is missing. The aggregated indicator is compiled taking factor loadings in principal components analysis as weights. 6 Similar to the good governance indicators, the overall regulatory quality is closely associated with GNI per capita, measured at purchasing power parity (PPP), as can be seen in Figure 1 . The partial correlation between the two variables is equal to 0.78. 
Model Specifications
In all our model specifications, the dependent variable is the log-level of GNI per capita, measured in PPP US dollars (the variable is labelled GNI). Given the assumption that percapita income levels were roughly similar in the very distant past, differences in current income levels reflect a diverging growth performance in the long run. By using per-capita income levels, we can interpret the estimates of the regressions as capturing the effects of the independent variables on growth in the very long run. We would have preferred a panel data analysis, but the regulatory variables are available only since 2003, which is not sufficient for a time-series analysis. The good governance indicators, in contrast, exist since 1996, but they are standardised indicators, obstructing a meaningful a time-series analysis as well.
As the independent variables, we include measures for geography and market size, in addition to indicators for institutions and trade. More specifically, we include the following explanatory variables: 7
• Distance from equator, measured as absolute value of latitude of the country's capital city (Distance) • Dummy for landlocked countries (Landlock)
• Market size, measured as total population in million people (Population)
• Trade, computed as the sum of imports and exports, divided by GDP (Trade)
• Institutional quality as specified in the previous section, that is, good governance and regulatory quality (Institution) • Ethno-linguistic fractionalisation of the population, measured as the average of ethno and linguistic diversity (Fractionalisation) and • Conflicts, computed as the number of internal and external conflicts that took place in a country from 1970 to 2004, multiplied by the intensity of each conflict (Conflict)
The first two variables are related to the geography of a country. Geography may have an impact on incomes through agricultural productivity and morbidity rates (Diamond, 1999) .
The distance from the equator can be interpreted as a proxy for various determinants of economic growth that relate to the climate. For example, a country with a tropical climate is 7 Data sources for all variables can be found in Appendix B. more likely to suffer from higher morbidity rates and thus lower growth rates due to malaria or other tropical diseases (Sachs, 2001 ). Thus, we expect a negative link with per-capita income. Being landlocked is likely to increase transport costs and hence, reduces trade and other economic activities across borders, in particular in developing countries with poor infrastructure (also negative linkage with income). The third variable, market size, may be another important determinant of per-capita income levels, since a large internal market is likely to be associated with increasing economic efficiency due to economies of scale and intensive competition. We proxy market size with the total population since we cannot use total GDP, and expect a positive coefficient.
Differences across countries in public policies and various economic indicators, including income levels, may also be explained by the ethno-linguistic diversity of a country (Easterly and Levine, 1997; Alesina et el., 2003) . Above all, a higher degree of fractionalisation may increase political and ethnic frictions within a country and lead to wasteful government spending. This is likely to be the case in developing countries, where low economic growth is associated with low schooling, political instability, insufficient public infrastructure, underdeveloped financial systems, and so on. The threat of incidence of internal and external conflicts, ranging from political violence, cross-border conflicts, civil disorder, civil (internal) war to an all-out war with other countries, clearly creates higher uncertainty. Domestic and international investors are then likely to increase the risk premium of their investment projects, which in turn reduces overall investment and negatively affects the country's growth rate. Other than investment, further economic and institutional variables, such as inflation, the effectiveness of aid or corruption levels, are negatively affected as well, which diminish prospects for economic development as a consequence (Collier and Hoeffler, 2004ab) . Researchers from both organisations have compiled information on various armed conflicts and have assigned quantitative figures for the intensity of each conflict. If there was no casualty involved, they assign a 0, for number of casualties in the range from 1 to 25 they give a 1, for 26 to 1000 casualties a 2 and above 1000 casualties a 3. While these numbers are necessarily arbitrary, they provide an useful dataset for any quantitative analysis as the intensity of each conflict is taken into account. For our analysis, we only include conflicts in the period from 1970 to 2004 in order to focus on the economic impact of more recent conflicts. Finally, we take the natural logarithm to reduce the skewness in the data. Similar to Fractionalisation, we expect a negative linkage of Conflict with per-capita income levels. Accordingly, the benchmark specification is as follows:
where ln GNI i is the (natural) log of per-capita income in country i, X i is the set of control variables explained above, and e i is an error term. Regional Dummy j stands for a full set of regional dummies to control for regional characteristics. In addition to GNI, the market size and the number and intensity of conflicts also enter the regressions in logs.
Above all, we are interested in whether the observed linkage between openness to trade and income levels differs for countries with, for instance, low-quality institutions. Hence, we test the hypothesis that low institutional quality hinders countries from taking advantage of increased openness to trade. For this exercise, we divide the country sample into groups according to their relative rankings in the institutional quality indicators. More specifically, we construct an institutional dummy (Institution Dummy), which has a value of one if a country belongs, for example, to the group of countries with the 20 per cent worst scores on institutional quality, and zero otherwise. We then compute an interactive term of the institutional dummy and trade to see whether institutions in the most regulated countries matter and add that to the list of independent variables. 9 The extended model specification can then be written as follows: For the quality of institutions, we follow the literature and use two different sets of variables that are partly based on history: First, the legal origin, that is, whether a country has a British, German, French, Scandinavian, or Socialist origin for its legal system, and second, the share of the population who speak English and/or a major European language. There is evidence that the colonial origin is still a major determinant of the current institutional setting and regulatory quality of a country (La Porta et al., 1998 , 1999 . The legal origin may have an influence on the disposition of countries when they intend to reform their institutional structure. Along these lines, the French legal origin is highly correlated with an excessive regulatory environment and may lead to lower quality institutions, particularly when the French legal system was implemented in developing countries (Djankov et al., 2002) . We do not, however, use mortality rates of European settlers as an instrument for institutional quality, as suggested by Acemoglu et al. (2001) , as this would severely reduce the number of countries included in our sample, which could bias the results.
Empirical Results
After introducing both model specifications, we next turn to the empirical results. We start with the benchmark equation (1) and OLS regressions (columns 1 to 6 of Table 1 Constant term is not shown due to space constraints; OLS regressions have been estimated with robust standard errors; t or z-values are reported in parentheses; multicollinearity has been tested by the creation of variance inflation factors (VIF), all regressions pass at conventional levels; 1 equation exactly identified; significance at the 10, 5, and 1 per cent levels are denoted by *, **, ***, respectively; instrumented variables (depending on the specification): Trade, Rule of Law, Regulation Index; instruments: Fittrade, Engfrac, Eurfrac, Legal Origin (British, French, German, and Scandinavian), and included exogenous variables.
Columns 6 to 12 in Table 1 show the results for the IV approach. Similar to the OLS regressions, we do not include institutional variables in the first three regressions but focus on trade only (columns 7 to 9). In line with the results reported by Rodrik et al. (2004) , we do not obtain a significant coefficient for Trade once we instrument for it. Moreover, the sign of the estimate for openness to trade switches between a positive and a negative sign. The results for the other control variables are roughly similar to those obtained in the OLS regressions. Still, both institutional indicators are highly significant and thereby, important determinants of percapita income levels (columns 10 to 12). In these specifications, the coefficients for Trade continue to be insignificant.
We assess the validity of the instruments using the Sargan test for overidentifying restrictions.
Our IV regressions are based on the assumption that the instruments are uncorrelated with the error term in the per-capita income equation. The results for the p-value of the J-test for each IV specification are reported in the last third row in Table 1 . For the last three specifications, we cannot reject the null hypothesis that the instruments are uncorrelated with the error term in all specifications.
11 This result means that our instruments are affecting income levels but only through the trade variable and the institutional indicators.
It is important to test for the instrument relevance when using IV estimation. Since we are using more instruments than endogenous variables (columns 10 to 12), we do not know if the instruments collectively capture the independent variation in the right-hand-side variables.
One way to assess this issue is to take a closer look at the magnitude of the R 2 in the first however, if we add further control variables and the regional dummies (columns 2 to 4).
We then instrument for trade, regulations and the interactive term (columns 5 to 8). The regulatory quality is still an important explanatory variable for variations in per-capita income. Similar to the results presented in Table 1 , Trade is no longer significant in the IV regressions. The interactive term has now a negative and significant coefficient in three out of four specifications, implying that countries with the worst regulatory quality are not able to benefit from an increasing market integration. The selected instruments are both valid and appropriate for all three instrumented variables, as can be seen from the results for the Shea partial R 2 and the Sargan test. Table 1 ; significance at the 10, 5, and 1 per cent levels are denoted by *, **, ***, respectively. For the IV regressions with the interactive term, we also explore the interactions of the legal origin and the language variables with the instruments selected from our identifying assumptions as instruments.
To ascertain whether the results are influenced by the particular threshold level chosen for the institution dummy, we repeat the exercise for the top 30, 40 and 50 per cent most regulated economies (Bottom 30, Bottom 40, and Bottom 50) . In comparison to the 20 per cent most regulated countries, the significance levels of the coefficients for the interactive term slightly improve if we set the cut-off point at the 30 per cent most regulated economies (top-left in Table 3 ). While the interactive term is also statistically significant in one out of four OLS regressions, it is significant in all four IV regressions. Yet if we increase the threshold level to 40 or 50 per cent most regulated countries, the number of significant coefficients declines considerably. These results indicate that there is a particular threshold level, which is highly relevant for our results. In other words, low-quality regulations do not allow the top 20 or 30 per cent most regulated economies to take advantage of trade.
Contrary to the most regulated countries, we do not obtain significant results for the countries with better regulatory quality (Top 20 to Top 50). This does not imply, however, that these countries are able to achieve gains from trade. Rather, the chosen cut-off points for the dummy or the aggregation procedure for the regulation index might contribute to this outcome. Therefore, we repeat the analysis for all ten disaggregated regulations indicators. By applying them individually, we are able to identify those regulation sub-components that drive our results. Out of the ten sub-components, Labour Market Regulation shows the strongest results. In all OLS and IV specifications, we obtain a negative and significant coefficient for the interactive term, independent of whether we use the 20, 30, 40 or 50 per cent threshold level.
13 Countries with less regulated labour markets, on the other hand, are able to benefit from trade, since the sign of the coefficient is positive and significant in almost all model specifications. Following this, governments should have a strong incentive to reform their regulatory framework.
We also find strong results for regulations related to starting a business and paying taxes. For 2 Sign of the coefficient. 3 Due to the distribution of the figures for the indicator, we use the 18, 24, 36, and 46 per cent least regulated countries and the 24, 33, 46, and 54 per cent most regulated countries. 4 Here, we use the 17 and 41 per cent most regulated countries. 5 The positive (and significant) coefficient is due to one clear outlier (Malaysia). If we exclude this country, the significance level falls far below the 10 per cent level.
In another set of regressions, we employ the good governance variables for the computation of the institutional dummy. As opposed to the regulation indicators, we do not find a similarly strong influence of institutional quality on the interaction between trade and income levels (Table 4) . While the results of OLS regressions are broadly comparable to those of the first set of regressions, we hardly witness a consistent pattern in the instrumental approach. For
Rule of Law and Control of Corruption there is some evidence that both variables matter (for the 20 per cent countries with the worst scores), but we do not obtain robust estimates. For Political Stability and Voice and Accountability, on the other hand, the coefficients for the interactive term in the IV regressions are not significant at all. One reason that might help to explain this rather disappointing outcome is the fact that the good governance indicators are perception-based and that the surveys conducted for the indicators are particularly influenced by different stages of development. This could explain the considerable differences between the OLS and IV results. 
Concluding Remarks and Policy Implications
Our results indicate that countries with low-quality institutions have not been able to take advantage of trade so far. Thus, institutional quality clearly plays a key role for successful trade liberalisation. Among the set of indicators for institutional quality, we find that, above all, the regulatory quality matters for an efficient reallocation of factor resources within an economy. Regulations related to the labour market, market entry, as well as the tax level and efficiency of the tax system are closely linked to the gains from trade. While we obtain a positive linkage between trade and income levels for countries with good scores for these indicators, the opposite applies to nations with excessive regulations. Other important regulation indicators for the linkage between trade and income are trading across borders, enforcing contracts, and closing down a business. For the good governance indicators, on the other hand, we are less likely to find significant interactive terms of trade and institutional quality, though that does not apply for the regulatory quality and government effectiveness (bottom 20 per cent countries), and, to a lesser degree, for the rule of law and control of corruption.
While the results demonstrate the importance of institutional quality, they do not imply that the countries with low-quality institutions will never be able to achieve the potential gains from trade. Rather, the outcome demonstrates that these countries are unlikely to benefit from trade with their current institutional setting. Unfortunately, our results do not provide any guidance for institutional reform, which can be an enormous policy challenge for countries that start from a low level of formal institutional development. Following this, the question arises as to how comprehensive and integrated a strategy for institutional change should be and whether partial reforms could also be successful. For getting growth going, Aron (2000) , for example, argues that large-scale institutional transformation is hardly ever a prerequisite.
Rather, the initial impetus for growth could also be achieved with minimal changes in institutional arrangements. There is a need to distinguish between stimulating economic growth and sustaining it. Solid institutions appear much more important for the latter than for the former.
Any institutional change also depends on the selection of an appropriate strategy for reform.
In principle, there are three basic options: imitation, adaptation and innovation. Countries might have a preference for imitating models of institutional reforms that were successfully applied elsewhere, thus saving time and resources and repeating effective leapfrogging in the field of technology. However, there are clear warnings of simplistic institutional imitation.
Institutions that are effective in industrial countries can have quite different outcomes in developing countries, which, for example, have fewer complementary institutions, weaker administrative capacity, higher per-capita costs, lower human capital levels, different technology, and different levels and perceptions of corruption (World Bank, 2001 ).
According to Rodrik et al. (2004) , desirable institutional arrangements have a large element of context specificity due to differences in historical trajectories, geography and political economy or other initial conditions. A vivid indication that there is no blue print of an institutional design is the fact that countries with a similar level of income can have very different institutional settings. Therefore, cross-country studies are of limited value for specifying a reform agenda for any particular country (Jütting, 2003) . But there is wide consensus that in the same way in which imported technology needs to be adapted to the local conditions, some degree of adaptation is needed in order to make imported institutions work (Chang, 2005) .
Regardless of whether they are imported or innovated, new institutions should be designed to complement what exists. Both the historical European example and the more recent example from China illustrate that institutions tend to function well if they complement the existing environment in terms of other supporting institutions, human capabilities and available technologies (North, 1990 (North, , 1994 . Importantly, this has much to do with the political economy of reforms. Unless newly designed institutions enjoy a certain degree of political legitimacy among all major stakeholders of the society in question, they are not going to work.
